Publications
Our Epistemic Dependence on Others: Nyāya and Buddhist Accounts of Testimony as a Source of Knowledge
Journal of Hindu Studies 17 (1): 62-80 (2024). [Published version]
In Progress
The Action-Knowledge Principle in Indian Philosophy
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa on the Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreement
How Do You Know That You Know What You Know? Buddhist and Nyāya Responses to a Mīmāṃsā Challenge
Our Epistemic Dependence on Others: Nyāya and Buddhist Accounts of Testimony as a Source of Knowledge
Journal of Hindu Studies 17 (1): 62-80 (2024). [Published version]
- This paper argues that philosophical debates between Nyāya and Buddhists on the nature and acquisition of testimonial knowledge present contrasting images of the role played by the epistemic agent in the knowing process. According to Nyāya, an individual can acquire testimonial knowledge automatically—and with little epistemic work—from a trustworthy speaker’s say-so. On the other hand, Buddhist epistemologists, who claim that testimonial knowledge is a species of inferential knowledge, argue that, in order to acquire knowledge from a speaker’s statements, an epistemic agent must possess non-testimonial evidence for the reliability of the testimony in question. This disagreement regarding the division of epistemic labour in testimonial exchanges demonstrates how differently Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers view the prevalence and practical importance of testimonial knowledge. For Nyāya, the ubiquity and easy acquisition of testimonial knowledge help explain the success of our daily actions. However, for Buddhist epistemologists, despite the regularity with which we successfully act based on what others tell us, testimonial knowledge is, in fact, less common, and more difficult to acquire, than we might think.
In Progress
The Action-Knowledge Principle in Indian Philosophy
- This paper looks at a debate between a late 9th century Nyāya philosopher, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor on the Action-Knowledge Principle. In the Indian context, the Action-Knowledge Principle states that an agent should only act on the basis of an awareness that she rationally takes to be knowledge. Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā interlocutor supports this principle, arguing that doubt is not a suitable basis for rational action. On the other hand, Jayanta argues that in certain cases, rational action can take place on the basis of doubt. Jayanta’s position entails that there are no epistemic norms, where epistemic norms are presumed to be universal, on action. Instead, Jayanta argues that practical factors play a role in determining how strong an agent’s epistemic position must be in order for that agent to rationally act. After presenting and textually supporting Jayanta’s argument, I assess whether Jayanta can respond to objections raised by his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor. I also discuss the central factors at play in the disagreement between Jayanta and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor. Finally, I argue that Jayanta’s argument that practical factors affect the epistemic requirements on action is better able to account for our ordinary intuitions concerning the link between knowledge and action.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa on the Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreement
- This paper looks at Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s view on the epistemic significance of religious disagreement. In particular, it looks at his argument for why disagreement between religious texts is of no real epistemic significance. I present the key moves of this argument and discuss Jayanta’s view in light of contemporary “steadfast views” in the epistemology of disagreement. I also examine whether Jayanta’s assessment of religious disagreement entails epistemic permissiveness.
How Do You Know That You Know What You Know? Buddhist and Nyāya Responses to a Mīmāṃsā Challenge
- This paper looks at a debate between Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, and Mīmāṃsakas on how we know that our beliefs amount to knowledge. While Buddhists and Naiyāyikas generally believe that we need independent evidence to rationally determine that our beliefs amount to knowledge, Mīmāmsakas argue that such independent evidence is not necessary and if required would lead to infinite regress. I present and assesses the different strategies employed by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas in response to the Mīmāṃsā charge of infinite regress.
