Publications
Our Epistemic Dependence on Others: Nyāya and Buddhist Accounts of Testimony as a Source of Knowledge
Journal of Hindu Studies 17 (1): 62-80 (2024). [Published version]
This paper argues that philosophical debates between Nyāya and Buddhists on the nature and acquisition of testimonial knowledge present contrasting images of the role played by the epistemic agent in the knowing process. According to Nyāya, an individual can acquire testimonial knowledge automatically—and with little epistemic work—from a trustworthy speaker’s say-so. On the other hand, Buddhist epistemologists, who claim that testimonial knowledge is a species of inferential knowledge, argue that, in order to acquire knowledge from a speaker’s statements, an epistemic agent must possess non-testimonial evidence for the reliability of the testimony in question. This disagreement regarding the division of epistemic labour in testimonial exchanges demonstrates how differently Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers view the prevalence and practical importance of testimonial knowledge. For Nyāya, the ubiquity and easy acquisition of testimonial knowledge help explain the success of our daily actions. However, for Buddhist epistemologists, despite the regularity with which we successfully act based on what others tell us, testimonial knowledge is, in fact, less common, and more difficult to acquire, than we might think.
In Progress
Knowledge and Action in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (under review)
This paper looks at a debate between a late 9th century Nyāya philosopher, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor on the Action-Knowledge Principle. Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā interlocutor accepts that in order to rationally act on the basis of an awareness a, an agent must rationally take a as having knowledgehood. On the other hand, Jayanta rejects this principle and argues that the epistemic standards for relying on a in practical reasoning vary with context. According to Jayanta, in low stakes situations, rationally acting on the basis of a usually takes place on the basis of doubt about whether a has knowledgehood. On the other hand, in high stakes situations, rationally acting on the basis of a requires the agent to rationally take a as having knowledgehood. After presenting and textually supporting Jayanta’s argument through an analysis of three different test cases, I assess whether Jayanta can respond to objections raised by his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor. Ultimately, I argue that Jayanta’s rejection of the Action-Knowledge Principle and his alternative account of practical reasoning, whereby the standards of practical reasoning vary according to context, fares better than the account provided by his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor.
Doubt Beyond Dilemma: Jayanta Bhaṭṭa on Epistemic Indeterminacy (under review)
This paper presents a debate between the ninth-century Nyāya philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor concerning the nature and causal conditions of doubt. While both hold that doubt is a cognition characterized by indeterminacy and generated by specific causal conditions, they disagree about when those causal conditions—and therefore doubt itself—are present. Both Jayanta and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor argue that doubt arises from the apprehension of a property common to incompatible alternatives, as in the standard case of doubt over whether an object seen in the distance is a tree trunk or a person. In such cases, doubt has a dilemmatic structure in which competing alternatives are cognitively apprehended. While Jayanta accepts this causal account of doubt, he argues that its explanatory scope extends beyond ordinary cases of object-level uncertainty to cases in which the uncertainty concerns the epistemic status of the cognition itself. On this interpretation, the phenomenological experience of conflict between alternatives is not a necessary condition for the presence of doubt. I conclude by arguing that Jayanta's account raises a broader methodological question for contemporary theories of doubt: should doubt be individuated by the conditions that generate it or by the features through which it is ordinarily experienced and identified?
How Do You Know That You Know What You Know? Buddhist and Nyāya Responses to a Mīmāṃsā Challenge
This paper looks at a debate between Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, and Mīmāṃsakas on how we know that our beliefs amount to knowledge. While Buddhists and Naiyāyikas generally believe that we need independent evidence to rationally determine that our beliefs amount to knowledge, Mīmāmsakas argue that such independent evidence is not necessary and if required would lead to infinite regress. I present and assesses the different strategies employed by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas in response to the Mīmāṃsā charge of infinite regress.
Our Epistemic Dependence on Others: Nyāya and Buddhist Accounts of Testimony as a Source of Knowledge
Journal of Hindu Studies 17 (1): 62-80 (2024). [Published version]
This paper argues that philosophical debates between Nyāya and Buddhists on the nature and acquisition of testimonial knowledge present contrasting images of the role played by the epistemic agent in the knowing process. According to Nyāya, an individual can acquire testimonial knowledge automatically—and with little epistemic work—from a trustworthy speaker’s say-so. On the other hand, Buddhist epistemologists, who claim that testimonial knowledge is a species of inferential knowledge, argue that, in order to acquire knowledge from a speaker’s statements, an epistemic agent must possess non-testimonial evidence for the reliability of the testimony in question. This disagreement regarding the division of epistemic labour in testimonial exchanges demonstrates how differently Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers view the prevalence and practical importance of testimonial knowledge. For Nyāya, the ubiquity and easy acquisition of testimonial knowledge help explain the success of our daily actions. However, for Buddhist epistemologists, despite the regularity with which we successfully act based on what others tell us, testimonial knowledge is, in fact, less common, and more difficult to acquire, than we might think.
In Progress
Knowledge and Action in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (under review)
This paper looks at a debate between a late 9th century Nyāya philosopher, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor on the Action-Knowledge Principle. Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā interlocutor accepts that in order to rationally act on the basis of an awareness a, an agent must rationally take a as having knowledgehood. On the other hand, Jayanta rejects this principle and argues that the epistemic standards for relying on a in practical reasoning vary with context. According to Jayanta, in low stakes situations, rationally acting on the basis of a usually takes place on the basis of doubt about whether a has knowledgehood. On the other hand, in high stakes situations, rationally acting on the basis of a requires the agent to rationally take a as having knowledgehood. After presenting and textually supporting Jayanta’s argument through an analysis of three different test cases, I assess whether Jayanta can respond to objections raised by his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor. Ultimately, I argue that Jayanta’s rejection of the Action-Knowledge Principle and his alternative account of practical reasoning, whereby the standards of practical reasoning vary according to context, fares better than the account provided by his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor.
Doubt Beyond Dilemma: Jayanta Bhaṭṭa on Epistemic Indeterminacy (under review)
This paper presents a debate between the ninth-century Nyāya philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor concerning the nature and causal conditions of doubt. While both hold that doubt is a cognition characterized by indeterminacy and generated by specific causal conditions, they disagree about when those causal conditions—and therefore doubt itself—are present. Both Jayanta and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor argue that doubt arises from the apprehension of a property common to incompatible alternatives, as in the standard case of doubt over whether an object seen in the distance is a tree trunk or a person. In such cases, doubt has a dilemmatic structure in which competing alternatives are cognitively apprehended. While Jayanta accepts this causal account of doubt, he argues that its explanatory scope extends beyond ordinary cases of object-level uncertainty to cases in which the uncertainty concerns the epistemic status of the cognition itself. On this interpretation, the phenomenological experience of conflict between alternatives is not a necessary condition for the presence of doubt. I conclude by arguing that Jayanta's account raises a broader methodological question for contemporary theories of doubt: should doubt be individuated by the conditions that generate it or by the features through which it is ordinarily experienced and identified?
How Do You Know That You Know What You Know? Buddhist and Nyāya Responses to a Mīmāṃsā Challenge
This paper looks at a debate between Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, and Mīmāṃsakas on how we know that our beliefs amount to knowledge. While Buddhists and Naiyāyikas generally believe that we need independent evidence to rationally determine that our beliefs amount to knowledge, Mīmāmsakas argue that such independent evidence is not necessary and if required would lead to infinite regress. I present and assesses the different strategies employed by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas in response to the Mīmāṃsā charge of infinite regress.
