Publications

Our Epistemic Dependence on Others: Nyāya and Buddhist Accounts of Testimony as a Source of Knowledge
Journal of Hindu Studies 17 (1): 62-80 (2024). [Published version] 

• This paper argues that philosophical debates between Nyāya and Buddhists on the nature and acquisition of testimonial knowledge present contrasting images of the role played by the epistemic agent in the knowing process. According to Nyāya, an individual can acquire testimonial knowledge automatically—and with little epistemic work—from a trustworthy speaker’s say-so. On the other hand, Buddhist epistemologists, who claim that testimonial knowledge is a species of inferential knowledge, argue that, in order to acquire knowledge from a speaker’s statements, an epistemic agent must possess non-testimonial evidence for the reliability of the testimony in question. This disagreement regarding the division of epistemic labour in testimonial exchanges demonstrates how differently Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers view the prevalence and practical importance of testimonial knowledge. For Nyāya, the ubiquity and easy acquisition of testimonial knowledge help explain the success of our daily actions. However, for Buddhist epistemologists, despite the regularity with which we successfully act based on what others tell us, testimonial knowledge is, in fact, less common, and more difficult to acquire, than we might think.

In Progress
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The Action-Knowledge Principle in Indian Philosophy
Forthcoming, Philosophy Compass

• This paper looks at a debate between a late 9th century Nyāya philosopher, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor on the Action-Knowledge Principle. This principle states that an agent should only act on the basis of an awareness that she rationally takes to be knowledge. While Jayanta’s Mīmāṃsā interlocutor supports this principle, Jayanta argues for its limited application in high-stakes situations. In most everyday contexts, Jayanta argues that agents act rationally when they undertake action on the basis of an awareness whose epistemic status they are in doubt about. This is because this type of doubt is usually epistemically insignificant. However, in high-stakes contexts, the epistemic standards for action are raised. In these cases, the practical features of the case make it so that the agent needs to be in a stronger epistemic position, one that allows them to rule out the possibility of error. I argue that Jayanta’s analysis of doubt and the epistemic significance of practical factors, demonstrates the disadvantage of subscribing to the universal application of the Action-Knowledge Principle. I also assess the main areas of contention between Jayanta and his Mīmāṃsā interlocutor

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa on the Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreement 

• This paper looks at Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s view on the epistemic significance of religious disagreement. In particular, it looks at his argument for why disagreement between religious texts is of no real epistemic significance. I present the key moves of this argument and discuss Jayanta’s view in light of contemporary “steadfast views” in the epistemology of disagreement. I also examine whether Jayanta’s assessment of religious disagreement entails epistemic permissiveness. 

​How Do You Know That You Know What You Know? Buddhist and Nyāya Responses to a Mīmāṃsā Challenge 

• This paper looks at a debate between Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, and Mīmāṃsakas on how we know that our beliefs amount to knowledge. While Buddhists and Naiyāyikas generally believe that we need independent evidence to rationally determine that our beliefs amount to knowledge, Mīmāmsakas argue that such independent evidence is not necessary and if required would lead to infinite regress. I present and assesses the different strategies employed by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas in response to the Mīmāṃsā charge of infinite regress.  ​